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1. Overview of the research
To what extent do Italian courts adapt the national legal instru-
ments (principles, rules, techniques, legal concepts) regarding state 
structure to the requirements of EU law? This paper aims to give an 
answer to this question by providing an overview of the most em-
blematic cases of “re-adaptations” operated by the Italian courts in 
order to ensure the respect of the structural principles of EU law.
This contribution is structured as follows: first, I will explain the 
reasons why research like this is “difficult”, while secondly I will move 
to the analysis of some legal instruments (principle of competence, 
substitutive power, “cedevolezza”). Some final remarks will be pre-
sented at the end of the paper. Generally speaking, my main idea is 
that EU law has had a certain impact on the relationship between 
State and Regions in Italy, especially looking at the seasons of the 
principle of competence, that has been conceived more and more as 
referring to the idea of “legislative preference” rather than as to the 
existence of a “legislative reserved domain”.1
Article received 05/09/2011; approved 17/10/2011.
1. L. Paladin, Le fonti del diritto italiano, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2000, 93 ff.
37
REAF, núm. 14, octubre 2011, p. 36-66
How “European” is the Italian Regional State now?
A preliminary caveat should be made before proceeding with 
the analysis of the instruments and techniques reinvented by the Ital-
ian Courts for favouring the respect of the principles of EU law. One 
should keep in mind the strongly dogmatic nature of the Italian legal 
system: while the ECJ has been inspired by a strong pragmatism, which 
gave its case law a certain flexibility, the Italian Constitutional Court 
is the guardian of a set of principles imbued with the dogmatic flavour 
of its legal tradition, very refined from a theoretical point of view but 
also resistant to being reshaped. Bearing this in mind, one can ap-
preciate the efforts made by both courts in their attempt to carry out 
a sort of convergence, renouncing, at least partly, their original posi-
tions (dualism as for the Italian Constitutional Court and monism for 
the ECJ).
This premise makes clear the focus of the paper. Given the uni-
tary system of courts existing in Italy, and given the particular role of 
arbiter of conflicts between State and Regions that has to be attrib-
uted to the Italian Constitutional Court, I am going to focus on its 
case law when developing my reasoning in these pages. Obviously, 
this does not mean that “common” courts (i.e. ordinary and admin-
istrative courts) have not readapted legal concepts under pressure 
from EU law, an example is given by the administrative courts, as 
pointed out by the domestic literature.2
Research like this presents itself as very problematic for at least 
two reasons: the well known principle of “territorial blindness” of the 
EU, and the less studied “procedural impermeability” that character-
izes the case law of the Italian Constitutional Court. 
Territorial blindness refers to the fact that, traditionally, from 
a “formalistic” point of view, the Regions have been neglected in 
the EU law context. To express such a situation, German constitu-
2. F. Cortese, “ECJ and Administrative Courts in EU Member States: Towards a Common 
Judicial Reasoning?” in F. Fontanelli, G. Martinico and P. Carozza (eds.), Shaping Rule of 
Law through Dialogue. International and Supranational Experiences, Groningen: Europa 
Law Publishing, 2010, pp. 257-271; M. Gnes, “Giudice amministrativo e diritto comunitario” 
1999 Riv. trim diri. pubbl., 331 ff; N. Pignatelli, “L’illegittimità comunitaria dell’atto am-
ministrativo”, Giur. cost., 2008, 3635 ff.
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tional lawyers use the formula “Landesblindheit”3 (legal blindness 
towards the territorial subnational entities or simply territorial blind-
ness). This was confirmed in the Treaties (specifically in the former 
Article 10 ECT), where it can be seen that the subjects of the Com-
munity legal order are the states, as holders of the duty to collabo-
rate with each other, which is instrumental for guaranteeing the 
effectiveness of the supranational law. It could well be argued that 
this “regional neglect” constitutes just one “element” of the demo-
cratic deficit of the EU. 
Starting from a “broad” concept of the democratic gap4 (i.e. 
focused not only on the question of the EU Parliament’s powers) we 
can in fact conceive the absence of a strong legal status for the Regions 
as one of the most important “constitutional wounds” of the EU, even 
after the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty. There are a number 
of reasons for that: the internationalist origin of the European enter-
prise, the heterogeneity, in terms of composition, of the Committee 
of Regions, and the lack of specific remedies for them in order to 
challenge possible violations of their prerogative.
Despite their unclear status under EU law, Regions play a fun-
damental role in the implementation of the multilevel policies as the 
example of the cohesion policies demonstrate.
Procedural impermeability refers to the general reluctance of 
the Italian Constitutional Court to be involved in interpretative 
questions that, directly or indirectly, may have to do with EU law. 
3. H.P. Ipsen, “Als Bundesstaat in der Gemeinschaft”, E. von Caemmerer-H.J. Schlochauer- 
E. Steindorff (eds.), Probleme des europäischen Rechts: Festschrift für Walter Hallstein, 
1966, Bonn, 248.
4. R. Bellamy, “Still in Deficit: Rights, Regulation and Democracy in the EU”, European Law 
Journal, 2006, pp. 725-742; B.Crum, “Tailoring Representative Democracy to the European 
Union: Does the European Constitution Reduce the Democratic Deficit?”, European Law 
Journal, 2005, pp. 452-467; A. Follesdal- S. Hix, “Why There is a Democratic Deficit in the 
EU: A Response to Majone and Moravcsik”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 2006, pp. 
533-562; G. Majone, “Europe’s ‘Democratic Deficit’: The Questions of Standards”, Euro-
pean Law Journal, 1998, pp. 5-28; A. Moravcsik, “In Defence of the ‘Democratic Deficit’: 
Reassessing Legitimacy in the European Union”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 2002, 
pp. 603-24; J.H.H. Weiler, “Bread and Circus: The State of European Union”, Columbia 
Journal of European Law, 1998, pp. 223-24.
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The origin of this doctrine can be traced back to the post-Granital5 
scenario, when the Italian Constitutional Court decided to entrust 
the common judges with the role of natural guardians of the Sim-
menthal doctrine,6 closing this way the doors (at least in principle)7 
of the constitutional proceedings to the potential conflicts between 
national law and EU law, since it conceives such potential conflicts 
as questions of legality and not questions of constitutionality. 
2. The substantive principles concerning the 
relationship between State and Regions
2.1. The principle of competence
According to the principle of conferral of competences,8 the 
State and the Regions can only act within the limits of the compe-
tences conferred on them by the Constitution to attain the objectives 
set out in the fundamental charter. In Italian constitutional law, there 
are three typologies of competences.9 The first are competences ex-
clusive to the State, which are listed in Article 117, paragraph 2, of 
the Constitution. The second are shared (or concurring) competences 
where State and Regions co-legislate, a “portion” of the matter being 
acknowledged to each. It is up to the State to give the fundamental 
principles of the legislative regime by means of legislation known as 
“framework law” (c.d. “legge-quadro”), and it is up to the Region to 
5. Corte Costituzionale, sentenza n. 170/1984. Granital: 1984 CMLRev 756. About this see: 
M. Cartabia, Principi inviolabili e integrazione europea, Giuffrè, Milan 1995.
6. ECJ Case C-106/77 Simmenthal [1977] ECR I-62.
7. For this concept and for the exceptions to this scheme see: F.Fontanelli-G.Martinico, 
“Between Procedural Impermeability and Constitutional Openness: The Italian Constitu-
tional Court and Preliminary References to the European Court of Justice”, European Law 
Journal. 2010, pp. 346-364.
8. On the principle of competence in the Italian legal system, see: G. Zanobini, “Gerarchia 
e parità tra le fonti”, in Studi in onore di S. Romano, vol. I, Padua, 1939, p. 303; V.Crisa-
fulli, “Gerarchia e competenza nel sistema costituzionale delle fonti”, in Rivista Trimestra-
le Diritto Pubblico, 1960, 775 ff; V. Crisafulli, Lezioni di diritto costituzionale, II, 1, L’ordi-
namentocostituzionale italiano (le fonti normative), Padua, 1993, 234 ff; A. Moscarini, 
Competenza e sussidiarietà nel sistema delle fonti, Cedam, Padua, 2003; L. Paladin, Le 
fonti del diritto italiano, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2000, 93 ff
9. A. D’Atena, “Materie legislative e tipologia delle competenze”, Quaderni Costituziona-
li, 2003, pp. 15-24.
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fill in (“complete”) the framework by giving the detailed provisions, 
which should be consistent with the fundamental principles laid down 
by the State act. As is evident, this model of “shared competence” 
differs from the German pattern of konkurrierende Gesetzgebung.10 
In Germany, when the State and its Länder share a competence, the 
Land “shall have power to legislate so long as and to the extent that 
the Federation has not exercised its legislative power by enacting a 
law” (Art. 72 Const, Grundgesetz). According to the Italian model, 
instead, the activities of the two actors are conceived of as “comple-
mentary”. Thirdly, still according to Article 117 of the Constitution,11 
10. On this distinction, see A. Anzon, “La delimitazione delle competenze dell’Unione 
Europea”, http://www.associazionedeicostituzionalisti.it/materiali/anticipazioni/competen-
ze_ue/index.html.
11. Art. 117 provides:
“Legislative powers shall be vested in the State and the Regions in compliance with the 
Constitution and with the constraints deriving from EU legislation and international ob-
ligations.
The State has exclusive legislative powers in the following matters:
(a) foreign policy and international relations of the State; relations between the State and 
the European Union; right of asylum and legal status of non-EU citizens;
(b) immigration;
(c) relations between the Republic and religious denominations;
(d) defence and armed forces; State security; armaments, ammunition and explosives;
(e) the currency, savings protection and financial markets; competition protection; foreign 
exchange system; state taxation and accounting systems; equalisation of financial re-
sources;
(f) state bodies and relevant electoral laws; state referenda; elections to the European 
Parliament;
(g) legal and administrative organisation of the State and of national public agencies;
(h) public order and security, with the exception of local administrative police;
(i) citizenship, civil status and register offices;
(l) jurisdiction and procedural law; civil and criminal law; administrative judicial system;
(m) determination of the basic level of benefits relating to civil and social entitlements to 
be guaranteed throughout the national territory;
(n) general provisions on education;
(o) social security;
(p) electoral legislation, governing bodies and fundamental functions of the municipalities, 
provinces and metropolitan cities;
(q) customs, protection of national borders and international prophylaxis;
(r) weights and measures; standard time; statistical and computerised coordination of data 
of state, regional and local administrations; works of the intellect;
(s) protection of the environment, the ecosystem and cultural heritage.
 Concurring legislation applies to the following subject matters: international and EU 
relations of the Regions; foreign trade; job protection and safety; education, subject to 
the autonomy of educational institutions and with the exception of vocational education 
and training; professions; scientific and technological research and innovation support for 
productive sectors; health protection; nutrition; sports; disaster relief; land-use planning; 
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the Regions have legislative powers in all subject matters that are not 
expressly covered by State legislation (i.e., not included in the list of 
express powers laid down in the same Article 117), and these compe-
tences should be understood as “exclusive” to the Regions. Following 
the constitutional reform of 2001, the Regions have been invested 
with a great amount of competence. At least, so it seems on paper 
looking at the Constitution. The transformation of the Regions into 
“residual legislators” represents the most important novelty in the 
constitutional reform of 2001, which has (potentially) contributed to 
a sort of Copernican revolution. However when looking at the real 
situation, both some judgments of the Italian Constitutional Court 
and the presence of “transversal matters” (matters that are not real 
matters12 but rather clauses allowing the State to intervene in differ-
civil ports and airports; large transport and navigation networks; communications; na-
tional production, transport and distribution of energy; complementary and supplemen-
tary social security; harmonisation of public accounts and co-ordination of public finance 
and taxation system; enhancement of cultural and environmental properties, including 
the promotion and organisation of cultural activities; savings banks, rural banks, regional 
credit institutions; regional land and agricultural credit institutions. In the subject matters 
covered by concurring legislation legislative powers are vested in the Regions, except for 
the determination of the fundamental principles, which are laid down in State legislation.
The Regions have legislative powers in all subject matters that are not expressly covered 
by State legislation.
The Regions and the autonomous provinces of Trent and Bolzano take part in prepara-
tory decision-making process of EU legislative acts in the areas that fall within their re-
sponsibilities. They are also responsible for the implementation of international agreements 
and EU measures, subject to the rules set out in State law which regulate the exercise of 
subsidiary powers by the State in the case of non-performance by the Regions and au-
tonomous provinces.
Regulatory powers shall be vested in the State with respect to the subject matters of ex-
clusive legislation, subject to any delegations of such powers to the Regions. Regulatory 
powers shall be vested in the Regions in all other subject matters. Municipalities, prov-
inces and metropolitan cities have regulatory powers as to the organisation and imple-
mentation of the functions attributed to them. Regional laws shall remove any hindranc-
es to the full equality of men and women in social, cultural and economic life and promote 
equal access to elected offices for men and women.
 Agreements between a Region and other Regions that aim at improving the performance 
of regional functions and that may also envisage the establishment of joint bodies shall 
be ratified by regional law.
In the areas falling within their responsibilities, Regions may enter into agreements with 
foreign States and local authorities of other States in the cases and according to the forms 
laid down by State legislation”.
12. F. Benelli, La “smaterializzazione delle materie”. Problemi teorici ed applicativi del 
nuovo Titolo V della Costituzione, Giuffrè, Milan, 2007; F. Benelli, “L’Ambiente tra ‘sma-
terializzazione’ della materia e sussidiarietà legislativa”, www.forumcostituzionale.it/site/
index3.php?option=content...; R. Bin, “Materie e interessi: tecniche di individuazione 
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ent ambits, for example, the so-called legislation on the “determina-
tion of the basic level of benefits relating to civil and social entitlements 
to be guaranteed throughout the national territory”, which can evi-
dently serve as a Trojan horse for the centralization of competences) 
a very different picture seems to emerge. 
Having recalled the different types of competences, looking at 
the history of the Italian Regions in relation to Europe one can im-
mediately realize how European commitments have reshaped the 
original distribution of competences.13 Many instances of this can be 
found in the case law of the Constitutional Court as we will see in the 
next sections of this paper. The engine of this process has been the 
territorial blindness mentioned above. Since the State is the only en-
tity responsible in case of non-compliance with the requirements of 
EU law, in many cases the European Court of Justice14 has been shown 
not to care about the domestic separation of competences when deal-
ing with cases of non-compliance. This in turn has pushed the Italian 
actors to force the original distribution of competences in order to 
avoid sanctions stemming from belonging to the EU.15
delle competenze dopo la riforma del Titolo V”, paper presented at the workshop orga-
nized by the IDAIC – Siena, 25-26 November 2005, 5; P. Carrozza, “Le ‘materie’: uso delle 
tecniche di enumerazione materiale delle competenze e modelli di riferimento del ‘re-
gionalismo di esecuzione’ previsto dal nuovo Titolo V della Costituzione”, in G.F. Ferrari 
and G. Parodi (eds.), La revisione costituzionale del titolo V tra nuovo regionalismo e 
federalismo. Problemi applicativi e linee evolutive, Cedam, Padua, 2003, pp. 69-124.
13. T. Groppi, “L’incidenza del diritto comunitario sui rapporti Stato-regioni in Italia dopo 
la riforma del Titolo V”, http://www.unisi.it/ricerca/dip/dir_eco/grop.htm; M.P. Chiti, “Re-
gioni e integrazione europea”, in Reg. gov. loc., 1994, 547 ff.; A.D’Atena, “Il doppio in-
treccio federale: le regioni nell’Unione europea”, Le Regioni, 1998, 1401 ff. Recently P.
Zuddas, L’influenza del diritto dell’Unione europea sul riparto di competenze legislative 
fra Stato e Regioni, Padua, Cedam, 2010.
14. See cases 169/82, Commission v Italy [1984] ECR 1603 ff. and 168/85, Commission v It-
aly [1986] ECR 2945. On this, see Groppi, “L’incidenza”; G. Guzzetta, Costituzione e rego-
lamenti comunitari, Milan, 1994, 171 ff; M. Cartabia and V. Onida, “Le regioni e la Comu-
nità europea”, in M.P. Chiti and G. Greco (eds.), Trattato di diritto amministrativo, Giuffrè, 
Milan, 1997, 605 ff.
15. “Regions’ activities – or lack of activities – in their areas of competence have sometimes 
left Italy temporarily out of compliance with EU rules. This is a problem for the national 
government, as it cannot then plead the existence of provisions, practices or circumstances 
in its internal legal system in order to justify a failure to comply with EU obligations and 
time limits (Case C-33/90, Case C-388/01). Indeed, infringement procedures against Italy have 
been initiated several times over the last decade in fields of regional or concurrent compe-
tence; that is, in policy areas where the fulfilment of European obligations requires legisla-
tive or administrative acts by the regions. This has been particularly troublesome in envi-
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Just to be clear, the Italian Constitutional Court, as we will see, 
has been always open to the reshaping of the list of competences 
listed in the different versions of Article 117. We could say that the 
European mandate has only increased such a predisposition, giving 
another reason to the Italian Constitutional Court to centralize com-
petences in favour of the State.16
When looking at the role of the Regions in the implementation 
phase, one should distinguish between administrative and legislative 
activities. As for the administrative side of the implementation, it has 
been acknowledged that Regions have the power to implement (here 
implementation should be distinguished from transposition, of course) 
regulations (Art. 6 D.P.R. no. 616/1977). There is recognition of a gen-
eral function of address and coordination for the administrative func-
tions performed by the Regions17 which can be exercised when the 
requirements of EU law involve the necessity of unitary interest over 
the whole of the national territory (Art. 9, law no. 86/1989).18 
ronmental matters (e.g., cases C-225/96, C-87/02C-466/99, C-248/02, C-139/04), but has also 
affected trade fairs, markets and exhibitions (Case C-439/99). The Eur-infra database (http://
eurinfra.politichecomunitarie.it/ElencoAreaLibera.aspx), concerning pending cases at the 
European Court of Justice, supports this conclusion. Indeed, in at least six cases out of 40 
concerning environmental policies, non-compliance was provoked by regional activity. Con-
flicts between regioni and stato on environmental issues often end up before the Corte 
Costituzionale. In order to prevent non-compliance with EU obligations, the stato has been 
vested with the power to execute by substitution in lieu of the regione (Articles 117.5 and 
120 Const., Law No. 11/2005). In some cases, the stato is even given the authority to act in 
a preventive way (for instance, under the Constitutional Court’s guidelines (Judgment No. 
272/2005), the stato could legitimately adopt an urgency instrument in order to implement 
EU obligations (such as the milk quota), without involving the Conferenza Stato-Regioni. 
National acts aimed at avoiding non-compliance are temporary measures, and can be sub-
stituted for by properly adopted regional acts” P. Bilancia-F. Palermo-O. Porchia, “The Eu-
ropean Fitness of Italian Regions”, Perspectives on Federalism, Vol. 2, issue 2, 2010, E-122-174, 
E-167, http://www.on-federalism.eu/attachments/063_download.pdf.
16. Groppi, “L’incidenza”.
17. On this function see: L. Paladin, “Sulle funzioni statali di indirizzo e di coordinamento 
nelle materie di competenza regionale”, in Giur. Cost., 1971, I, 189 ff.; F. Bassanini, “Indi-
rizzo e coordinamento delle attività regionali”, in D. Serrani (ed.), La via italiana alle re-
gioni, Giuffè, Milano, 1972, 43 ff.; L. Carlassare, “I problemi dell’indirizzo e coordinamen-
to: le soluzioni giurisprudenziali”, Le Regioni, 1985, 29 ff; G. Falcon, “Spunti per una 
nozione della funzione di indirizzo e coordinamento come vincolo di scopo”, Le Regioni, 
1989, 1184 ff.
18. Law 86/89 (“Legge La Pergola”) set up a complex mechanism aimed at ensuring the 
implementation of EU law and introduced an annual Community law (“legge comuni-
taria”). “Legge La Pergola” has been replaced by law n. 11/2005 (“Legge Buttiglione”).
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As for the legislative implementation, the issue is much more 
complicated. Originally the State responsibility in cases of non-com-
pliance (D.P.R. no. 4/1972) convinced it to centralize the competences 
on State organs, with the consequent alteration of the regional com-
petences. Later (Art. 6 D.P.R. no. 616/1977) the Regions were granted 
the power to implement EC directives with regional law, but before 
doing so they had to wait for a State law for the reception of such 
directives, including the fundamental principles of the matter plus 
some derogable provisions. We will see this point in the next section 
when dealing with the issue of cedevolezza and the more recent 
evolutions of the Italian legislation which acknowledge the possibil-
ity that the Regions could implement EC directives directly, although 
with more than one caveat.
How did the Italian Constitutional Court react to this shift of 
competences that occurred in name of EC law commitments? First, 
the Italian Constitutional Court seemed to admit the possibility that 
EC law requirements could de facto lead to a particular form of shift 
in the original distribution of competences in the name of the State 
responsibility for compliance with EC law requirements.19 In sentenza 
no. 224/199420 the Italian Constitutional Court pointed out how the 
regional competences are subject to limits introduced by EC law, say-
ing that sometimes EC law can render the conditions and prerequisites 
of the regional competence inoperative. In sentenza no. 399/8721 the 
Italian Constitutional Court said that Community bodies are not re-
quired to respect domestic law fully, even that concerning the distri-
bution of competences between State and Regions (at the same time 
the Italian Constitutional Court stressed the necessity to respect fun-
damental principles of the Italian constitutional system- the so-called 
“counter-limits”).22 In that case, within the frame of the Integrated 
19. See sentenza no. 382/1993 and sentenza no. 632/1988. Groppi, “L’incidenza”; P. Caret-
ti and G.Strozzi, “Luci ed ombre nella più recente giurisprudenza costituzionale in mate-
ria di adempimento agli obblighi comunitari”, in Le regioni, 1988, 196 ff. For a prima 
facie opposite conclusion, see sentenza no. 124/1990.
20. Corte Costituzionale, sentenza no. 224/1994, www.cortecostituzionale.it.
21. Corte Costituzionale, sentenza no. 399/87, www.cortecostituzionale.it.
22. On the counter-limits doctrine, see M. Cartabia, “The Italian Constitutional Court and 
the Relationship between the Italian Legal System and the European Union”, in A. Slaugh-
ter, A. Stone Sweet and J. H. H. Weiler (eds), The European Court and National Courts – 
Doctrine and Jurisprudence, Hart, Oxford, 1997, pp. 133-146; P. Ruggeri Laderchi, “Report 
on Italy”, ibid., pp. 147-170. The formula “controlimiti” was used for the first time by P. 
45
REAF, núm. 14, octubre 2011, p. 36-66
How “European” is the Italian Regional State now?
Mediterranean Programmes, EC legislation has given the Regions func-
tions that differ in part from those included in the catalogue of com-
petences in the national Constitution.
The leading case in this matter is sentenza no. 126/1996,23 where 
the Italian Constitutional Court pointed out how the implementation 
of EC norms in the Member States has to take into account their 
structure (centralized, decentralized, federal). However, in the name 
of the principle of State responsibility for the implementation of EC 
law, the Italian Constitutional Court distinguished between a compe-
tence of first instance accorded to the Regions in the ambits of their 
competence and a competence of second instance accorded to the 
State. Such a competence of second instance permits the intervention 
of the State but may not create seizure of the competences, rather it 
justifies supplementary substitutive interventions aimed at defending 
the State itself from the risk of non-compliance due to regional omis-
sions or actions.24 This scheme explains why it is also recognized that 
the State might challenge the constitutionality of regional laws that 
contrast with EC law obligations, this being an exception to the gen-
eral rule of procedural impermeability (see infra). 
Barile, “Ancora su diritto comunitario e diritto interno”, in Studi per il XX anniversario 
dell’Assemblea costituente, VI, Firenze, 1969, 49 and ff.
23. Corte Costituzionale, sentenza no. 126/1996, www.cortecostituzionale.it.
24. “L’attuazione negli Stati membri delle norme comunitarie deve tenere conto della 
struttura (accentrata, decentrata, federale) di ciascuno di essi, cosicché l’Italia è abilitata, 
oltre che tenuta dal suo stesso diritto costituzionale, a rispettare il suo fondamentale 
impianto regionale. Pertanto, ove l’attuazione o l’esecuzione di una norma comunitaria 
metta in questione una competenza legislativa o amministrativa spettante a un soggetto 
titolare di autonomia costituzionale, non si può dubitare che…normalmente ad esso spet-
ti agire in attuazione o in esecuzione, naturalmente nell’ambito dei consueti rapporti con 
lo Stato e dei limiti costituzionalmente previsti nelle diverse materie di competenza re-
gionale..Tuttavia, poiché dell’attuazione del diritto comunitario nell’ordinamento interno, 
di fronte alla Comunità europea, è responsabile integralmente e unitariamente lo Stato…, 
a questo – ferma restando, secondo quanto appena detto, la competenza in ‘prima istan-
za’ delle regioni e delle province autonome – spetta una competenza, dal punto di vista 
logico, di ‘seconda istanza’, volta a consentire a esso di non trovarsi impotente di fronte 
a violazioni del diritto comunitario determinate da attività positive o omissive dei sogget-
ti dotati di autonomia costituzionale. Gli strumenti consistono non in avocazioni di com-
petenze a favore dello Stato, ma in interventi repressivi o sostitutivi e suppletivi – questi 
ultimi anche preventivi, ma cedevoli di fronte all’attivazione dei poteri regionali e provin-
ciali normalmente competenti – rispetto a violazioni o carenze nell’attuazione o nell’ese-
cuzione delle norme comunitarie da parte delle regioni” (sentenza no. 126/1996). On this, 
see Groppi, “L’incidenza cit.”.
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Sentenza no. 126/1996 represented the outcome of a long juris-
prudential journey, whereby the Italian Court specified, once again, 
the possibility of an alteration of the normal distribution of compe-
tences in the name of unitary reasons connected with the compliance 
with EC/EU requirements (see, ex plurimis, sentenza no. 382/1993 and 
no. 389/1995).25 At the same time it showed how these alterations 
should be conceived as the exception and not as the rule, trying to 
“normalize” the otherwise devastating impact of EC law on the na-
tional system. In order to balance the constitutional supremacy (the 
respect of the constitutional distribution of competences) and the 
primacy of EC law, the Italian system has been forced to adopt or to 
invent cooperative instruments that can push State and Regions to-
wards specific agreements in this regard. On the other hand, it has 
forced the Italian Constitutional Court to declare the unconstitution-
ality of some State laws adopted without respecting these cooperative 
procedures:26 
“The process of European integration has generally affected the 
traditionally uncooperative relationship between stato and re-
gioni in a positive way. However, a relatively high number of 
conflicts remain, especially when compared to other European 
countries. The main conflict-prevention mechanism is the Con-
ferenza stato-regioni, which brings national and regional go-
vernments together to draft general policy guidelines or for 
specific purposes (by means of specialized sub-conferences on 
varying subjects). The most relevant conflict-resolution mecha-
nism in the case of tension between the central government and 
the regioni is still provided by the Corte Costituzionale; many 
cases heard here indeed regard EU affairs. Overall, the court has 
safeguarded regional prerogatives against stato interference, in 
part by ruling that it is unconstitutional for the stato to use its 
coordination role in EU affairs to take competences away from 
the regioni (Judgment No. 203/2003), at least without the 
regioni’s consent (Judgment No. 68/2008)”.27
25. Both available at www.cortecostituzionale.it.
26. Sentenza no. 203/2003 and sentenza no. 68/2008, both available at www.cortecostituz-
ionale.it.
27. P. Bilancia - F. Palermo - O. Porchia, “The European fitness cit”, E-166.
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2.2. The substitutive powers and cedevolezza
Italy has a long tradition of municipal history. The origins of Ital-
ian municipalities can be traced back to the Middle Ages (although, 
of course those “comuni” cannot be compared in terms of functions 
and role to the current municipalities), as a symptom of urban revolt 
against the feudal system.28 More recently, further evidence of the long 
municipal tradition in Italy is that the National Association of Italian 
Municipalities was set up as early as 1901. Of course the history of Ital-
ian municipalities encountered different phases, for instance, their 
autonomy was largely affected by the fascist centralism, when the 
National Association of Italian Municipalities was dissolved. In 1946 it 
was reconstituted and today municipalities represent the basic admin-
istrative division in Italy, as provided by Article 118 of the Constitution.
Why am I insisting on Italian comuni if this piece is supposed to 
focus on Regions? Because some of the instruments used in the Italian 
constitutional system in order to coordinate the unitary principle ex-
pressed in Article 5 of the Constitution with regional autonomy find 
their origin in the legislation concerning municipal autonomy. The 
best example of this is the substitutive power (or replacement power, 
sometimes also called subsidiary power, potere sostitutivo). Until 2001 
there was no express mention in the Italian Constitution of EC/EU law 
obligations and, as is well known, the Italian Constitutional Court used 
Article 11 of the Constitution in order to find a constitutional basis 
for explaining the primacy of European law.29
In 2001 a new express mention of EU law obligations was codi-
fied in Article 117 of the Constitution, providing: “Legislative power 
belongs to the State and the regions in accordance with the Consti-
tution and within the limits set by European Union law and interna-
tional obligations”. Soon after the reform, the interpretation of this 
provision created a division among scholars.30 According to some, Ar-
ticle 117, paragraph 1, would simply codify the pre-existing situation: 
28. See, for instance, M. Ascheri, La città-Stato, Il Mulino, 2008.
29. M.Cartabia, “The Italian Constitutional Court and cit”.
30. For an overview, see R. Chieppa, “Nuove prospettive per il controllo di compatibilità comu-
nitaria da parte della Corte costituzionale”, in Il Diritto dell’Unione Europea, 3/2007, 493-511, 
499 ff; A. Ruggeri, “Riforma del titolo V e giudizi di “comunitarietà” delle leggi”, 2007, http://
www.associazionedeicostituzionalisti.it/dottrina/ordinamentieuropei/ruggeri.html.
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it would grant a sort of a posteriori assent to European primacy31 
as it was developed by the ECJ and accepted across the European 
Community. Other scholars, on the other hand, emphasized the im-
portance of the constitutional status given to European primacy, and 
asserted that Article 117 paved the way for the acceptance of the 
Italian monist thesis.32 However, looking at the wording of Article 117 
one can immediately realize how the limitations imposed by EU law 
obligations apply to both the regional and state legislators, in light 
of the new distribution of competences carried out by the constitu-
tional reform of 2001.33
This express reference to EU law obligations explains the ration-
ale of the substitutive power, which was expressly codified in the 
Constitution in 2001:
“…The Government can act for bodies of the regions, metro-
politan cities, provinces and municipalities if the latter fail to 
comply with international rules and treaties or EU legislation, 
or in the case of grave danger for public safety and security, or 
whenever such action is necessary to preserve legal or economic 
unity and in particular to guarantee the basic level of benefits 
relating to civil and social entitlements, regardless of the geo-
graphic borders of local authorities. The law shall lay down 
the procedures to ensure that subsidiary powers are exercised 
in compliance with the principles of subsidiarity and loyal 
cooperation”34
On closer examination, it is possible to find another express ref-
erence to the notion of substitutive power in Article 117, par. 5 of the 
Italian Constitution:
31. C. Pinelli, “I limiti generali alla potestà legislativa statale e regionale e i rapporti con 
l’ordinamento comunitario”, in Foro italiano, V, 2001, 194 ff..
32. F. Paterniti, “La riforma dell’art. 117, 1° co. della Costituzione e le nuove prospettive 
dei rapporti tra ordinamento giuridico nazionale e Unione Europea”, in Giur. Cost., no. 
2/2004, 2101 ff; A. Pajno, “Il rispetto dei vincoli derivanti dall’ordinamento comunitario 
come limite alla potestà legislativa nel nuovo Titolo V della Costituzione”, in Le Istituzio-
ni del federalismo, 2003, pp. 814-842.
33. For a brief overview of Italian regionalism in English, see: M. Keating- A. Wilson, “Feder-
alism and Decentralisation in Italy”, http://www.psa.ac.uk/journals/pdf/5/2010/930_598.pdf.
34. Article 120.
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“The Regions and the autonomous provinces of Trent and Bol-
zano take part in preparatory decision-making process of EU 
legislative acts in the areas that fall within their responsibilities. 
They are also responsible for the implementation of internatio-
nal agreements and EU measures, subject to the rules set out in 
State law which regulate the exercise of subsidiary powers by 
the State in the case of non-performance by the Regions and 
autonomous provinces”.
There has been a huge debate in Italy about the relationship 
between these two forms of subsidiary powers. They are both forms 
of substitutive powers, according to scholars, but it is not clear how 
these two provisions should be coordinated. According to some au-
thors, Article 120 of the Constitution would provide the genus of 
substitutive powers existing in the constitutional system, while Article 
117 would refer to one species of the genus; it would be a mere 
specification of Article 120. According to other scholars,35 instead, 
Article 120 would refer to a form of administrative substitution (this 
would explain why the provision refers to the government), while 
Article 117 –devoted to the redistribution of legislative competences– 
would refer to a form of legislative substitution (and this would explain 
why it mentions the State rather than the government).
As noted above, this is the first constitutionalization of such an 
instrument, although traces of this power can be found in the legisla-
tive regime regarding the municipalities (namely Art. 193 Testo Unico 
1898; Art.169 and 174 Testo Unico 1889; Art. 210 Testo Unico 1908; 
Art. 216 Testo Unico 1915)36 and confirms how such a power can be 
traced back to the instruments of control over the activity of munici-
palities.37 
35. For an overview of the debate, see: C.Mainardis, Poteri sostitutivi statali e autonomia 
amministrativa regionale, Giuffrè, Milan, 2007; C. Mainardis, “I poteri sostitutivi statali: 
una riforma costituzionale con (poche) luci e (molte) ombre”, Le Regioni, 2001, 1369 ff.; 
E.C. Raffiotta, Gli interventi sostitutivi nei confronti degli enti territoriali, PhD thesis, Uni-
versity of Bologna, 2008, available at http://amsdottorato.cib.unibo.it/748/, 66 ff. L. Buffo-
ni, La metamorfosi della funzione di controllo nella Repubblica delle Autonomie. Saggio 
critico sull’art. 120, comma II, della Costituzione, Torino, Giappichelli, 2007.
36. See Raffiotta, Gli interventi sostitutivi, 13 ff.
37. On the relationship between the activity of control and the substitutive power, see: 
F.G. Scoca, “Potere sostitutivo e attività amministrativa di controllo”, in AA.VV. Aspetti e 
problemi dell’esercizio del potere di sostituzione nei confronti dell’amministrazione loca-
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Looking at the Republican era, which started with the coming 
into force of the new Italian Constitution (1948), another codification 
of the substitutive power –with express regard to the Italian Regions– 
can be found in some provisions included in the fundamental charters 
(“Statuti) of the Special Regions38 and by the measures of implemen-
tation of such special statutes (see Art. 50 of the Statuto of Sardinia 
and Art. 33 D.P.R. no. 480/1975 concerning Sardinia and Art. 39 of law 
no. 196/1978; Art. 2, p. 3, D.P.R. no. 182/1982). Just to be clear, all these 
provisions provide forms of “administrative” substitutive powers or 
forms of substitution that can be traced back to the relationship be-
tween administrations. This is evident especially in view of their mu-
nicipal origin, while the form of substitutive power governed by Ar-
ticles 117 and 120 of the Italian Constitution seems to refer to forms 
of “legislative” substitutive interventions as well but recently the Ital-
ian Constitutional Court expressed a different orientation making the 
picture more complicated.39 This is confirmed by Article 8 of law no. 
le, Giuffrè, Milan, 1982, 17 ff; A. de Michele, “Il potere sostitutivo dello Stato e delle Re-
gioni nel Titolo V, Parte II, della Costituzione, nella legislazione attuativa e nella giurispru-
denza”, PhD thesis, University of Bologna, 2007, http://amsdottorato.cib.unibo.it/122/.
38. In Italy there are two “kinds” of Regions. Fifteen ordinary Regions and five special 
Regions are listed in Art. 116 of the Constitution: “Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Sardinia, Sicily, 
Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol and Valle d’Aosta/Vallée d’Aoste have special forms and 
conditions of autonomy pursuant to the special statutes adopted by constitutional law. 
The Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol Region is composed of the autonomous provinces of 
Trent and Bolzano.
Additional special forms and conditions of autonomy, related to the areas specified in 
art. 117, paragraph three and paragraph two, letter l) - limited to the organisational 
requirements of the Justice of the Peace - and letters n) and s), may be attributed to 
other Regions by State Law, upon the initiative of the Region concerned, after consulta-
tion with the local authorities, in compliance with the principles set forth in art. 119. Said 
Law is approved by both Houses of Parliament with the absolute majority of their mem-
bers, on the basis of an agreement between the State and the Region concerned”. Cur-
rently in Italy there a debate about the real “specialty” of these five Regions after the 
new powers given to the ordinary regions by the constitutional reform of 2001 which 
gave ordinary regions “exclusive legislative power with respect to any matters not ex-
pressly reserved to state law”. Important differences between ordinary and special Regions 
are given by the nature of their fundamental charter (Statuto)- because ordinary Regions 
have fundamental charters approved by their Regional Councils- and by the issue of the 
financial autonomy, issue connected to the current reform in the field of fiscal federalism. 
On the Italian reform concerning fiscal federalism, in English, see F. Scuto, “The Italian 
Parliament Paves the Way to Fiscal Federalism”, Perspectives on Federalism, Vol. 2, issue 
1, 2010, E-67-88.
39. Contra, recently, the Italian Constitutional Court: sentenza 361/2010, www.cortecostituz-
ionale.it
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131/200340 (the legge La Loggia) which implemented Article 120 by 
specifying the conditions and the procedure to be followed in case of 
exercise of the substitutive power.41
As for the procedure to be followed, both laws provide similar 
procedures.42 The president of the Council of Ministers or the Minister 
for Community Policy gives a term to comply, and can also ask for the 
submission of the question to the permanent Conference on relations 
between the State, the Regions and the Autonomous Provinces of 
Trento and Bolzano/Bozen in order to arrange the necessary initiatives 
to be taken. In case of inertia of the interested territorial actors, the 
president of the Council of Ministers or the Minister for the Commu-
nity Policies may propose to the Council of Ministers the initiatives to 
be taken for the exercise of the substitutive power (Art. 10, par. 3, law 
no. 11/2005; similarly Art. 8 of law no. 131/2003).
Returning to the substantive dimension of the substitutive pow-
er, it should be said that, even in the pre-2001 legal scenario –and 
despite the absence of a constitutional basis– there was room for 
forms of legislative substitution in spite of the wording of Article 11 
of law no. 86/89 which expressly provided the substitutive power of 
the government in case of the administrative inactivity of Regions and 
Autonomous Provinces (Bolzano/Bozen and Trento). This original pro-
vision should be read together with the original wording of Article 6 
40. On this, see G. Scaccia, “Il potere di sostituzione in via normativa nella legge n. 131 
del 2003. Prime note”, available at www.associazionedeicostituzionalisti.it.
41. As for the subsidiary intervention mentioned by Art. 117, the implementing measure 
is represented by law no. 11/2005 (legge Buttiglione), available at http://www.camera.it/
parlam/leggi/05011l.htm.
42. Art. 10, par. 3, law no. 11/2005: “Nei casi di cui al comma 1, qualora gli obblighi di 
adeguamento ai vincoli derivanti dall’ordinamento comunitario riguardino materie di 
competenza legislativa o amministrativa delle regioni e delle province autonome, il Pre-
sidente del Consiglio dei ministri o il Ministro per le politiche comunitarie informa gli enti 
interessati assegnando un termine per provvedere e, ove necessario, chiede che la que-
stione venga sottoposta all’esame della Conferenza permanente per i rapporti tra lo Sta-
to, le regioni e le province autonome di Trento e di Bolzano per concordare le iniziative 
da assumere. In caso di mancato tempestivo adeguamento da parte dei suddetti enti, il 
Presidente del Consiglio dei ministri o il Ministro per le politiche comunitarie propone al 
Consiglio dei ministri le opportune iniziative ai fini dell’esercizio dei poteri sostitutivi di 
cui agli articoli 117, quinto comma, e 120, secondo comma, della Costituzione, secondo 
quanto previsto dagli articoli 11, comma 8, 13, comma 2, e 16, comma 3, della presente 
legge e dalle altre disposizioni legislative in materia.”
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of law no. 86/89, which did not provide at that time the possibility for 
the Regions to implement European directives in a direct manner (this 
power was granted only to the special Regions within the matter of 
their exclusive competences). In fact, under Article 6 of D.P.R. no. 
616/1977, Regions were allowed to implement EC directives only after 
the entry into force of a State act containing the fundamental prin-
ciples that should be followed by the regional legislator. At the same 
time Article 6 provided for this State act the possibility to give some 
detailed provisions that would have been waived by the forthcoming 
regional legislation. These norms were considered necessary to guar-
antee the compliance of the Italian State in case of legislative inertia 
by the regional legislator, and their legitimacy was supported by the 
Italian Constitutional Court.43
Later, the Regions were granted the power to implement Euro-
pean legislation directly without waiting for the State act of reception 
of the directive in the national system (law nos. 183/1987 and 86/1989). 
However, the Regions were asked to wait for the approval of the first 
national (annual) Community Act following the notification of the 
directive before implementing it. 
This mechanism again resulted in frustrating the power of direct 
implementation of the Italian Regions. 
Finally, thanks to the novelties that came into force with law no. 
128/98, the ordinary Regions have been empowered to implement 
European directives directly. This partly explains why the letter of 
Article 11 of law no. 86/89 refers only to cases of administrative inac-
tivity.44 This reading, in a way, has been supported by the Italian Con-
stitutional Court as well, in its decision no. 425/99.45 
There is another element that makes this kind of substitutive 
power in case of non-compliance with the European requirements 
particular: from the theoretical point of view, the idea of substitution 
seems to imply the adoption of the substitutive instrument subsequent 
43. Corte Costituzionale, sentenza 182/87, www.cortecostituzionale.it.
44. On this story, see: G.U. Rescigno, “Attuazione regionale delle direttive comunitarie e 
potere sostitutivo dello Stato”, Le Regioni, 2002, 735 and Groppi, “L’incidenza”.
45. Corte Costituzionale, sentenza 425/99, www.cortecostituzionale.it.
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to inactivity by the Region. However, on closer examination, before 
the coming into force of law no. 128/98, Article 9 of law no. 86/89 
referred to a form of “preventive substitution”, since it provided for 
State intervention initially, with a national act composed of two kinds 
of provisions. A first group of provisions gave the fundamental prin-
ciples that could not be waived by the regional legislation and a sec-
ond group of specific provisions (“disposizioni di dettaglio”) from 
which Regions could deviate by means of their regional laws. Accord-
ing to this scheme, even in the case of regional inactivity, the require-
ments of EC law would have been satisfied thanks to the detailed 
provisions included in the national law.
On the contrary, if the Regions had approved a regional law, 
these national detailed provisions would have “ceded”, giving up their 
intrusion in that portion of the shared competence belonging to the 
regional legislator, and the hand of the State legislator would “draw 
back”, leaving room for the new regional regime. This mechanism is 
called in Italy cedevolezza46 (from the Italian “cedere”, “to cede”) and 
has represented a fil conducteur of Italian regionalism since 1970, the 
year of the effective birth of the ordinary regions. This mechanism 
works in the field of shared competences and it can be seen as a tech-
nique devised by the Italian State legislator (and supported by the 
Italian Constitutional Court over the years) in order to avoid the dan-
ger of legislative gaps. In order to challenge any possible horror vacui, 
the State legislator has been granted the power to make “temporary” 
detailed provisions that represent an intrusion in the legislative com-
petences of the Regions. These have been upheld by the Italian Con-
stitutional Court47 because of their “temporary” and “supplementary” 
nature, since they are supposed to “disappear” magically once the 
Regions exercise their portion of legislative competence. In case of 
regional inactivity, as said above, the horror vacui is avoided thanks 
to the presence of a (State) regulation. As we saw, in the Italian con-
text, by “shared competences” one refers to the sphere of competence 
46. On cedevolezza, see: M. Motroni, Le norme cedevoli nel rapporto tra fonti statali e 
fonti regionali, PhD thesis, University of Ferrara, 2010, http://eprints.unife.it/323/1/TESI_DE-
FINITIVA.pdf.
47. Corte Costituzionale, sentenza no. 214/1985, www.cortecostituzionale.it. Compare this 
judgment with sentenza no. 40/1972, available at www.cortecostituzionale.it. See also 
decisions in cases no. 192/ 1987 and no. 729/1988, www.cortecostituzionale.it. For a com-
plete overview in Italian see: Motroni, Le norme cedevoli, pp. 63-94.
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that has to be completed or filled in by coordination between two 
legislative actors that participate, according a hypothetical division of 
labour, in the exercise of the legislative power. 
This “division of labour” refers to the fact that the State act 
intervening in a matter characterized by shared competences was 
supposed to give, primarily, the “fundamental principles” (“principi 
fondamentali”) that should then be followed by the Regional legisla-
tor, which should in turn build on these principles by passing detailed 
legislation. According to this scheme, it is possible to distinguish the 
idea of shared competences applied in Italy from that experienced in 
other contexts, like Germany, for instance.
One could connect the emergence of cedevolezza to the neces-
sity of guaranteeing legislative continuity in intra-temporal relation-
ships. Since the birth of the Italian (ordinary) Regions implied the 
transfer of competences, this meant that previously the matters with-
in the new regional jurisdiction were already subject to State legisla-
tion. Considering these previous State acts as automatically invalid 
would have led to the risk of legislative gaps pending the passing of 
new regional acts. As we can see, according to this logic, cedevolezza 
is justified on the basis of the entry into force of a new constitution-
al parameter and the necessity of guaranteeing stability in a period 
of transition.48 The Constitutional Court followed the same logic soon 
after the constitutional reform of 2001 which, as we know, changed 
the distribution of competences between the ordinary Regions and 
the State. However, what it is evident once we know the evolution of 
the Italian regional system is the use of cedevolezza even from the 
start of the functioning of the Regional legislatures as the rule to be 
followed in all the cases of legislation that involve shared compe-
tences, a practice upheld by the Italian Constitutional Court in 1985.49
The adoption of the technique of cedevolezza confirms the rise 
of a new kind of way of conceiving of the principle of “competence” 
48. M.Motroni, Le norme cedevoli, cit., pp. 63-94.
49. “La legge dello Stato [non] deve essere necessariamente limitata a disposizioni di 
principio, essendo invece consentito l’inserimento anche di norme puntuali di dettaglio, 
le quali sono efficaci soltanto per il tempo in cui la Regione non abbia provveduto ad 
adeguare la normativa di sua competenza ai nuovi principi dettati dal Parlamento”, Cor-
te Costituzionale, no. 214/85.
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as “legislative” preference rather than as “a legislative reserved 
domain”.50 According to this scheme, the Italian Constitution, when 
granting a portion of shared competence to the regional legislator, 
expressed a preference for this actor but, in order to guarantee the 
continuity of the legal order, admits the possibility of a temporary 
and derogable State legislative supply. More pragmatically, cedev-
olezza has permitted an evident centralization and a de facto altera-
tion of the distribution of competences over the years, since it has 
been used frequently in combination with the recall of “unitary prin-
ciples”, finally favouring the centralization of the competences.51 Even 
after the coming into force of the new Title V of the Italian Constitu-
tion, cedevolezza seems to be still alive, despite what the Italian Con-
stitutional Court has seemed to suggest in occasional decisions, like 
one given in 2002.52
Returning to the specific field of the implementation of EU law 
measures, one could wonder whether the new Article 117 of the Con-
stitution, which expressly codifies the regional competence to comply 
with EU law requirements, can represent the end of the technique of 
cedevolezza in this specific ambit. Despite the many doubts raised by 
scholars,53 this particular kind of cedevolezza has to be understood as 
confirmed in this ambit by the different Community acts – “leggi 
comunitarie” – which have come into force since the constitutional 
reform.54 According to this trend, the State legislator is allowed to 
adopt detailed provisions whose coming into force is delayed pending 
the deadline provided for the implementation of the directive in case 
of regional inertia.55 
Something similar is confirmed in law no. 11/2005, which also 
provides the State with the possibility to perform the substitutive 
power by a regulation (“regolamento”, which is a secondary source) 
50. L. Carlassare, “La ‘preferenza’ come regola dei rapporti tra fonti statali e regionali 
nella potestà legislativa ripartita”, Le Regioni, 1986, 236 ff.
51. Among others, A. D’Atena, Le Regioni dopo il big-bang. Il viaggio continua, Milano, 
2005, 76 ff.
52. Case 282/2002, www.cortecostituzionale.it.
53. Motroni, Le norme cedevoli, 95 ff.
54. Laws no. 39/2002, no. 39, 14/2003 and 306/2003, for instance.
55. On this, see G.U.Rescigno, “Attuazione regionale delle direttive”.
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even in matters covered by regional legislation (see Art. 11, par. 8, of 
this law).56 This applies even in matters of exclusive regional compe-
tence, and despite the fact that Article 117 of the Constitution provides: 
“Regulatory powers shall be vested in the State [only?] with respect 
to the subject matters of exclusive legislation”. In conclusion, despite 
the change of the letter of the Constitution, the case law of the Ital-
ian Constitutional Court and also the Parliament have confirmed many 
of the principles and practices characteristic of the previous climate 
of Italian regionalism. 
Before moving to the next section it is interesting to point out 
how the Italian Constitutional Court recently acknowledged the bi-
lateral nature of cedevolezza by recognizing the validity of the legis-
lation of the Friuli-Venezia Giulia Region. These norms included some 
derogable and supplementary fundamental principles introduced to 
prevent the possibility that the absence of a relevant State act would 
result in a situation of regional non-implementation. By regional law 
no. 11/2005, Friuli-Venezia Giulia implemented directive 2001/42/CE 
without waiting for the national legislation including the fundamen-
tal principles of the matter. Since the matter touched many transver-
sal ambits the regional legislator decided to pass regional legislation 
of principle, which had to be understood as derogable once the State 
legislation of principle was ready.57 The Italian Constitutional Court 
rescued this provision in its sentenza no. 398/96.58 
To conclude this section devoted to the mechanism used by the 
Italian State in order to deal with the risk of non-compliance due to 
regional inertia, one should recall that since the State now can ask 
56. According to some authors, it is possible to find a basis for this practice in the case law 
of the Constitutional Court, see the judgment in no. 425/99, www.cortecostituzionale.it. 
See: M.Motroni, Le norme cedevoli, 132.
57. Art. 12 of regional law no. 11/2005: “1. Le disposizioni contenute nel presente capo e nei 
regolamenti attuativi sono adeguate agli eventuali principi generali successivamente indivi-
duati dallo Stato nelle proprie materie di competenza esclusiva e concorrente di cui all’arti-
colo 117, commi 2 e 3, della Costituzione, con riferimento alla direttiva 2001/42/CE. 2. Gli atti 
normativi statali di cui al comma 1 si applicano, in luogo delle disposizioni regionali in con-
trasto, sino alla data di entrata in vigore della normativa regionale di adeguamento”.
58. Corte Costituzionale sentenza no. 398/2006, www.cortecostituzionale.it. S. Tripodi, 
“L’attuazione regionale delle direttive comunitarie e le clausole di cedevolezza. Nota a 
Corte cost., sent. n. 398/2006”, in www.federalismi.it, and M.Motroni, Le norme cedevoli 
cit, 134-137.
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the Regions for the reimbursement of any costs connected with their 
non-compliance with the requirements of EU law.59 
2.3. The principle of subsidiarity
Subsidiarity could be conceived of as an example of a principle 
that was originally alien to the Italian Constitution which was intro-
duced under the pressure applied by the EU level. 
As defined in the Oxford English Dictionary, subsidiarity implies 
the concept “that a central authority should have a subsidiary func-
tion, performing only those tasks which cannot be performed effec-
tively at a more immediate or local level”.60 This implies both a con-
stitutional preference for the exercise of a competence by the 
periphery and a “constitutional restraint on the exercise of those 
competences”61 for the centre.
The subsidiarity principle, due to its physiology, requires a sys-
tem of competences at least tending towards a repartition, and at 
the same time presupposes an “integrated” system like, for example, 
a federal system of a cooperative type. As a matter of fact, the prin-
ciple, as provided in the old Article 5 of the ECT,62 refers to a rela-
59. Art. 16- bis law no. 11/2005. On this see: P.Bilancia-F.Palermo-O.Porchia, “The Euro-
pean fitness cit”, E-167. 
60. Oxford English Dictionary, entry “Subsidiary” and “Subsidiarity”. 
61. R. Schütze, From Dual to Cooperative Federalism. The Changing Structure of European 
Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 209, 246.
62. As everybody knows the ECJ’s case law proves extremely elusive about the principle 
of subsidiarity.. The Court of First Instance and the ECJ have in fact always preferred not 
to deal with this ambiguity frontally, solving the cases challenging the legality of Com-
munity acts in the light of other arguments (perhaps already tested), without calling 
into question the issue of subsidiarity. 
If taken seriously, control on subsidiarity would lead the ECJ to verify the necessity of 
higher level substitution by carrying out a costs/benefits test (See P.Mengozzi, “Il principio 
di sussidiarietà nel sistema giuridico delle Comunità europee”, available at www.lumsa.
it/Lumsa/Portals/File/.../Mengozzi.pdf). On the contrary the European case law has been 
ambiguous since the Tribunal of first Instance and the ECJ has almost always avoided 
dealing with the issue frontally.
It is possible to distinguish several phases within the ECJ’s case law in this respect and 
an important line in this context is represented by the Amsterdam Protocol. A first gen-
eration of cases is characterized by a very careful and integration-friendly approach 
followed by the ECJ in C-84/94 (ECJ, C-84/94 United Kingdom v. Council, ECR,1996, I-5755) 
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and C-233/94 (ECJ, C-233/94, Germany v. Parliament and Council, ECR, 1997, I-2405), 
especially in the first case, where the Court, in responding to the British and German 
governments – which had linked the respect of the subsidiarity principle to the neces-
sity of an adequate motivation for an EC act – stated: “Once the Council has found that 
it is necessary to improve the existing level of protection as regards the health and 
safety of workers and to harmonize the conditions in this area while maintaining the 
improvements made, achievement of that objective through the imposition of minimum 
requirements necessarily presupposes Community-wide action, which otherwise, as in 
this case, leaves the enactment of the detailed implementing provisions required large-
ly to the Member States. The argument that the Council could not properly adopt meas-
ures as general and mandatory as those forming the subject-matter of the directive will 
be examined below in the context of the plea alleging infringement of the principle of 
proportionality… As to judicial review of those conditions, however, the Council must 
be allowed a wide discretion in an area which, as here, involves the legislature in mak-
ing social policy choices and requires it to carry out complex assessments. Judicial review 
of the exercise of that discretion must therefore be limited to examining whether it has 
been vitiated by manifest error or misuse of powers, or whether the institution concerned 
has manifestly exceeded the limits of its discretion” [emphasis added] (ECJ, C-84/94 
United Kingdom v. Council, ECR,1996, I-5755).
It is possible to infer at least four fundamental concepts from these sentences:
1. The ECJ conceives the test on subsidiarity to be an application of the proportionality 
test;
2. The ECJ conceives the control on subsidiarity to be a sort of extrema ratio, exploitable 
just in case of manifest error or misuse of power;
3. The control on subsidiarity touches the sensitive field of the legislative discretion and 
this reveals the “political” nature of this test;
4. Subsidiarity is a principle rather than a rule.
The control on subsidiarity has a strong procedural nature, it looks like the administra-
tive control on the “excès de pouvoir” and this explains why a very important role in 
this test is played by the analysis of the motivation of the EU acts. 
In another case, C-233/94, the ECJ again focused its control on the existence of a mo-
tivation:
“Although the Parliament and the Council did not expressly refer to the principle of 
subsidiarity in Directive 94/19, they complied with the obligation under Article 190 of 
the Treaty to give reasons, since they explained why they considered that their action 
was in conformity with that principle, by stating that, because of its dimensions, their 
action could be best achieved at Community level and could not be achieved suffi-
ciently by the Member States” (ECJ, C-233/94, Germany v. Parliament and Council, ECR, 
1997, I-2405).
After the Amsterdam Protocol something seemed to change, since the ECJ insisted on 
the procedural elements being taken into account in its control, the best example of 
this is case C-376/98 (ECJ, C-376/98 Germany v. Parliament and Council, ECR, 2000, I-8419: 
“Those provisions, read together, make it clear that the measures referred to in Article 
100a(1) of the Treaty are intended to improve the conditions for the establishment and 
functioning of the internal market. To construe that article as meaning that it vests in 
the Community legislature a general power to regulate the internal market would not 
only be contrary to the express wording of the provisions cited above but would also be 
incompatible with the principle embodied in Article 3b of the EC Treaty (now Article 5 
EC) that the powers of the Community are limited to those specifically conferred on it”).
This was an important, although ambivalent, decision although it has not been followed 
in later case law (see, for instance, ECJ, C-491/01 British American Tobacco (Investments) 
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tionship between two institutional actors (a lower actor, the periph-
ery, and a higher actor, the centre) sharing the same power and 
whose exercise is preferentially given, at first instance, to the actor 
closer to the citizens (i.e., the local level). Scholars usually label this 
first instance as the negative side of subsidiarity, since it implies the 
duty of non-intervention by the centre. At the same time, this prin-
ciple allows the possibility to substitute the chosen local actor if the 
same power can be exercised in a better or more efficient way by 
and Imperial Tobacco, ECR,.2002, I-11453). By the way, the ECJ has always insisted on the 
idea of connecting proportionality, subsidiarity and deference for the legislative branch 
and that is why some scholars sadly concluded that “despite its literally presence, the 
principle of subsidiarity has remained a subsidiary principle of European constitutional-
ism” (R.Schütze, From dual, cit., 256).
This case law explains why in the last few years all the attempts to reform the principle 
of subsidiarity have attempted to emphasize the procedural side of such a control, en-
trusting a crucial role to the national legislatures as the provisions included in the Con-
stitutional Treaty and in the Lisbon Treaty show. The only way to limit the legislative 
discretion seems to be to impose procedural guarantees such as those proposed by the 
Constitutional Treaty and contained in the “Protocol on the application of the principles 
of subsidiarity and proportionality”.
As a result, a form of political monitoring called the “early warning mechanism” was 
provided in that Protocol. Under this measure, the Commission should transmit a draft 
legislative act to the national parliaments, giving them six weeks to determine if there 
is a violation of subsidiarity. If one-third of the parliaments decide there is a violation, 
the Commission is required to reconsider the proposal. In the Lisbon Treaty, there was 
some change. (See the new version of the Protocol: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:115:0201:0328:EN:PDF), because the time allowed for na-
tional parliaments to scrutinize draft law is raised from six to eight weeks. If one-third 
of national parliaments object to a draft legislative proposal on the grounds of a breach 
of subsidiarity – the “yellow card” mechanism – the Commission will then reconsider it. 
In addition, if a simple majority of national parliaments continue to object, the Commis-
sion refers the reasoned objection to the Council and Parliament, which will decide the 
matter – the “orange card”. In any case, unlike in the “red card mechanism”, the Com-
mission may challenge the national parliaments’ position. 
This idea confirms the deference shown by the ECJ towards the legislatures: since sub-
sidiarity involves political control, the best thing is entrusting its control to the political/
legislative competitors of the European Parliament and Council: the national parliaments, 
tasked with the mission to be the watchdog of subsidiarity. On this issue see: I. Cooper, 
“The Watchdogs of Subsidiarity: National Parliaments and the Logic of Arguing in the 
EU”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 44, 2, 2006, 281-304. On subsidiarity and EU 
law see: G.Davies, “Subsidiarity: the wrong idea, in the wrong place, at the wrong time’, 
Common Market Law Review, 2006, pp. 63-84; P. Syrpis, “In Defence of Subsidiarity”, 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 2004, Vol. 24, pp. 323-334; A. Estrella, The EU Principle 
of Subsidiarity and Its Critique, OUP, 2002; “Subsidiarity and Self-Interest: Federalism at 
the European Court of Justice”, Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 41, No. 1, pp. 
1-128; G. Berman, “Taking Subsidiarity Seriously”, Columbia Law Review, 1994, 331 ff.; 
P.Kiiver, ‘The Early Warning System for the Principle of Subsidiarity: The National Parlia-
ment as a Conseil d’Etat for Europe’,European Law Review, 2011, pp. 98-108.
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the higher level. This way subsidiarity works as an elevator with 
regard to certain fungible acts that can be exercised in abstract by 
two institutional subjects and the substitution can be caused by the 
objective impossibility of the preferred actor carrying out the re-
quested action. 
Another important fact is that such impossibility of carrying 
out the functions has to be temporary this way there will be no 
obstacles to the restitution of the power. In this respect, it has been 
pointed out that the subsidiarity principle actually works as a crite-
rion for shifting, although not in a definitive way, the level that is 
supposed to intervene63 and, because of its constitutional relevance, 
it works as an element of flexibility in the system.64 This would explain 
why, within the EC context, subsidiarity has operated as a “method 
of policy centralisation”65 rather than as a factor of valorization of 
the de-centred realities in the absence of a formal catalogue of com-
petences. subsidiarity and competence are not, nevertheless, in a 
relationship of identity: in fact, it has been said that the principle of 
subsidiarity is not intended so much for the a priori formal allocation 
of competences, but rather for the a posteriori legitimation of the 
exercise of competences beyond those formally attributed.66
Having recalled the theoretical notion of subsidiarity and men-
tioned its uncertain nature in EU law, it is useful to see how the Italian 
Constitution has codified it. The principle of subsidiarity is dealt with 
by Article 118 of the Constitution both in its vertical and horizontal 
meaning:
“Administrative functions are attributed to the Municipalities, 
unless they are attributed to the provinces, metropolitan cities 
and regions or to the State, pursuant to the principles of subsi-
63. I. Massa Pinto, Il principio di sussidiarietà- Profili storici e costituzionali, Jovene, Naples, 
2003, p. 82. 
64. R. Bin, “I decreti di attuazione della “legge Bassanini” e la ‘sussidiarietà verticale’”, in 
A. Rinella, L. Coen and R. Scarciglia (eds), Sussidiarietà e ordinamenti costituzionali, Cedam, 
Padua, 1999, 169 ff. 
65. G. Davies, “Subsidiarity as a Method of Policy Centralisation”, Hebrew University In-
ternational Law Research Paper No. 11-06, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=921454. 
66. Massa Pinto, Il principio di sussidiarietà, 81.
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diarity, differentiation and proportionality, to ensure their uni-
form implementation.
Municipalities, provinces and metropolitan cities carry out ad-
ministrative functions of their own as well as the functions as-
signed to them by State or by regional legislation, according to 
their respective competences. State legislation shall provide for 
co-ordinated action between the State and the Regions in the 
subject matters as per Article 117, paragraph two, letters b) and 
h), and also provide for agreements and co-ordinated action in 
the field of cultural heritage preservation.
The State, regions, metropolitan cities, provinces and municipali-
ties shall promote the autonomous initiatives of citizens, both as 
individuals and as members of associations, relating to activities 
of general interest, on the basis of the principle of subsidiarity”
The principle of subsidiarity is also recalled at Article 120 of the 
Constitution, as we saw, and it is understood there as a limit to the 
indiscriminate use of the substitutive power of the government. 
In sentenza no. 303/2003 the Italian Constitutional Court re-
shaped the distribution of competences codified in the Constitution 
by using the subsidiarity principle as a Trojan horse. The Court stated 
that the national legislator is allowed to take away the exercise of 
administrative functions in matters belonging to the regional concur-
ring legislative power when a uniform exercise of these administrative 
functions is required. It is evident that the Italian Constitutional Court 
has expanded the original ambit of application of the subsidiarity 
principle by inventing a mechanism which was associated to the idea 
of “national interest”67 present in the wording of the old Title V of 
the Constitution but which disappeared after the 2001 reform. Ac-
cording to many authors, however, it is still present as an unwritten 
limit to the Regions’ powers:68
67. On the national interest (“interesse nazionale”) see: A. Barbera, Regioni e interesse 
nazionale, Giuffrè, Milan, 1973.
68. For an account of this debate, see R. Bin, “L’interesse nazionale dopo la riforma: con-
tinuità dei problemi, discontinuità della giurisprudenza costituzionale”, http://www.ro-
bertobin.it/ARTICOLI/interessi%20nazionali.htm; A. Barbera, “Chi è il custode dell’interes-
se nazionale?”, Quad. cost. 2001, 345 ff. 
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“While the principle of subsidiarity is used to allocate adminis-
trative functions, it is also used to introduce an element of fle-
xibility into the constitutional distribution of legislative power. 
Under the  principle of legality (a pillar of the rule of law), 
functions that are exercised at the national level according to 
the principle of subsidiarity must be organized and regulated 
by national law. In this way, one may derogate from the alloca-
tion of legislative competences contained in article 117 of the 
Constitution”.69
It seems useful to recall the solutions suggested by the Italian 
Constitutional Court for the relationship between subsidiarity and 
loyal cooperation: the former requires a “loyal cooperation” (“leale 
collaborazione”) between the territorial actors, concerted practices 
and bodies and, finally, a system of agreements between the institu-
tional actors. When deciding case no. 303/2003,70 the Italian Constitu-
tional Court adopted “a procedural and consensual approach to the 
principles of subsidiarity and adequacy, and it denied that such prin-
ciples can operate as mere verbal formulas capable of modifying, to 
the advantage of national law, the allocation of legislative powers 
established by the Constitution”.71
In doing so, the Italian Constitutional Court fixed a set of condi-
tions under which a derogation to the allocation of competences 
designed by the Constitution could be possible: the derogation should 
be “proportionate to the public interest that justifies the exercise of 
regional functions by the state, it must not be unreasonable in light 
of strict constitutional scrutiny, and, finally, the derogation should be 
the result of an agreement with the region”.72
This episode tells us at least two things. First, it confirms the 
centrality of the Constitutional Court in the destiny of Italian region-
alism. Secondly, it makes the task of tracing the constitutionalized 
69. T. Groppi and N. Scattone, “Italy: The Subsidiarity Principle”, International Journal of 
Constitutional Law, 2006, 4 (1): 131-137, 134.
70. Corte Costituzionale, sentenza no. 303/2003, available at www.cortecostituzionale.it. 
71. T. Groppi-N. Scattone, “Italy: The Subsidiarity Principle”, 135. See also A. Morrone, “La 
Corte costituzionale riscrive il Titolo V?”, available at http://www.forumcostituzionale.it. 
72. Ibid.
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idea of subsidiarity back to the EC (or German) model more compli-
cated. While the ECJ normally avoids engaging in debates concerning 
subsidiarity, the Italian Constitutional Court used subsidiarity to re-
shape Italian regionalism.73 Of course, looking at the results achieved 
by the two courts with their respective behaviours, they are analogous: 
in both cases, despite its original meaning and goal (favouring the 
decentralized exercise of “constitutional” functions), subsidiarity 
worked as a factor of centralization. However, the paths followed in 
these two cases seem to be different.
3. Final remarks 
Some authors74 have described EU integration as one of the 
most important factors that led to the Italian constitutional reform 
of 2001. This is true, and by itself it gives an exhaustive answer to 
the research question formulated at the beginning of this paper: all 
the institutional actors, including the judges, have adapted old 
mechanisms or existing principles or, alternatively, amended the 
Constitution in order to guarantee the effectiveness of EU law. As 
we saw, the Italian Constitutional Court has played a fundamental 
role both in the history of Italian regionalism and, more particu-
larly, in the European path of Regions, sometimes supporting the 
centralization of competences other times preserving the regional 
sphere of autonomy.
The current phase seems to be characterized by a rediscovery 
of the importance of cooperative instruments and by the proce-
dural principles of subsidiarity and loyal cooperation that, in theo-
ry at least, should represent a sort of shield against the (temporary) 
alteration of the list of competences. However, as we can see by 
looking at the principles of competence and subsidiarity, the Italian 
Constitutional Court has demonstrated its openness to broad inter-
73. Several other judgments followed sentenza 303/2003, but none of them questioned 
the strong link between subsidiarity and loyal cooperation, see in particular sentenza no. 
6/2004 and the more recent sentenza. 79/2011, both available at: www.cortecostituzionale.
it. For a recent overview on this see: C.Mainardis, “Chiamata in sussidiarietà e strumenti 
di raccordo nei rapporti stato – regioni”, available at: http://www.robertobin.it/REG11/
mainardis_def.pdf 
74. P.Bilancia-F.Palermo-O.Porchia, “The European fitness cit”, E-144.
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pretation of the fundamental charter thus making our Constitution 
more flexible. This factor should be taken into account. My final 
impression is that of a (still) quite unstable picture where external 
(i.e., international or European) factors can have a decisive impor-
tance in changing, from time to time, the outcome of the never-
ending balancing act between the competing interests of the State 
and the Regions.
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ABSTRACT
To what extent do Italian courts adapt the national legal instruments (prin-
ciples, rules, techniques, legal concepts) regarding state structure to the 
requirements of EU law? This paper aims to give an answer to this question 
by providing an overview of the most emblematic cases of “re-adaptations” 
operated by the Italian courts in order to ensure the respect of the struc-
tural principles of EU law. This contribution is structured as follows: first, I 
will explain the reasons why research like this is “difficult”, while secondly 
I will move to the analysis of the of some legal instruments (principle of 
competence, substitutive power, “cedevolezza”). Some final remarks will 
be presented at the end of the paper. Generally speaking, my main idea is 
that EU law has had a certain impact on the relationship between State 
and Regions in Italy, especially looking at the seasons of the principle of 
competence, that has been conceived more and more as referring to the 
idea of “legislative preference” rather than as to the existence of a “legis-
lative reserved domain”.
Key words: Europeanization; Italy; Regions; Italian Constitutional Court; re-
gional blindness.
RESUM
Fins a quin punt els tribunals italians adapten els instruments legals nacionals 
(principis, regles, tècniques, concepts legals) pel que fa a l’estructura estatal 
als requisits de les normes de la UE? Aquest article vol respondre a aquesta 
pregunta bo i proporcionant una visió de conjunt dels casos més emblemàtics 
de “readaptacions” efectuades pels tribunals italians per tal d’assegurar el 
respecte als principis estructurals de la legislació europea. La meva contribu-
ció s’estructura de la manera següent: primer explicaré les raons per les quals 
una investigació com aquesta és “difícil”, i en segon lloc analitzaré alguns 
instruments legals (principi de competència, poder substitut, cedevolezza). 
A les conclusions hi inclouré alguns altres comentaris finals. En general, la 
idea principal que defenso és que la legislació de la UE ha tingut un cert 
impacte en la relació entre l’Estat i les regions a Itàlia, sobretot, quant a les 
raons del principi de competència, el qual ha estat concebut com afí a la idea 
de la “preferència legislativa” més que no pas a la de l’existència d’una “re-
serva legislativa”.
Paraules clau: europeïtzació; Itàlia; regions; Tribunal Constitucional Italià; 
ceguesa regional.
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RESUMEN
¿En qué medida adaptan los tribunales italianos los instrumentos legales 
nacionales (principios, reglas, técnicas, conceptos legales) en cuanto a la es-
tructura estatal a los requisitos de las normas de la UE? Este artículo aspira 
a dar una respuesta a esta pregunta proporcionando una visión de conjunto 
de los casos más emblemáticos de “readaptaciones” efectuadas por los tri-
bunales italianos para asegurar el respeto a los principios estructurales de la 
legislación europea. Mi contribución se estructura de la manera siguiente: 
primero explicaré las razones por las cuales una investigación como esta es 
“difícil”, y en segundo lugar analizaré algunos instrumentos legales (princi-
pio de competencia, poder sustituto, cedevolezza). En la conclusión realiza-
ré otros comentarios finales. En general, la idea principal que defiendo es 
que la legislación de la UE ha tenido un cierto impacto en la relación entre 
el Estado y las regiones en Italia, especialmente con respecto a las razones 
del principio de competencia, que se ha concebido afín a la idea de la “pre-
ferencia legislativa” más que a la de la existencia de una “reserva legislativa”.
Palabras clave: europeización; Italia; regiones; Tribunal Constitucional Italia-
no; ceguera regional.
